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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant correctly cites its burden on appeal to marshall
all of the evidence supporting the verdict.
meet that burden.

Defendant fails to

Following are facts which defendant failed to

marshall, but which are of record and strongly support the jury
verdict.
On the evening of November 8, 1988, plaintiff, Michael H.
Suhr, was driving a semi-truck in a northwesterly direction along
Interstate 84 in Box Elder County approximately five miles
northwest of Snowville, Utah.

This is an interstate highway with

limited access. All fences along said highway system are owned,
installed and maintained by the defendant.

(Jury Instruction

No. 27).
Just as nightfall was arriving plaintiff's truck hit an 800
pound black steer standing in the plaintiff's traffic lane. The
pavement at this location is black asphalt.

Suhr's truck was

damaged and he sustained personal injuries in the accident.
The fences required to protect the interstate in that area
are a "Type B" fence as mandated by both UDOT and federal
requirements.

(TR 290, 291). Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, which is

included in the Addendum of this Brief, shows the design
requirements for Type B fence.

The requirements specify two

inches of clearance between the ground and the bottom wire of the

fence.

The requirements also specify that the top wire of the

fence shall be 52 inches above ground level.
In close proximity to the accident site is an area where
water erosion cut a channel beneath the freeway fence.
referred to this location as the "washout".
been eroding for approximately 20 years.

Plaintiff

This washout had

(TR 137)

UDOT had been

dumping fill in the washout three, four or five times every year.
(TR 138)

UDOT stated its reason for dumping fill in the washout

was so that animals could not get out beneath the fence.

(TR

223)
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Stephens investigated the
accident and returned to the scene the next afternoon to check
the fence.

When asked whether the 800 pound steer could have

entered the freeway at the location of the washout, Trooper
Stephens indicated that a steer of that size could get its neck
under the fence and might be able to push its way underneath.

He

claimed to have seen steers do this before due to the tremendous
amount of lift which an 800 pound animal can apply.

(TR 86)

Trooper Stephens indicated the distance from the bottom of the
washout to the lowest wire of the fence was approximately 18 to
24 inches.

(TR 93)

Tom Wilcock was called and testified that he had over 30
years experience handling cattle.
steer which was hit.

He was the owner of the black

He testified that the day after the

accident he inspected the fence in the area of the washout.
The bottom of the fence would have been bent like
you was going out. That spot, I believe, served as a
2

rub for the cattle to stick in their heads and rub
their neck. (TR 335 19-22)
Tom Wilcock testified that based upon the condition of the fence
and his knowledge of cattle, the steer could have gone under the
fence in the washout.

(TR 336)

Clinton Burt was qualified by plaintiff as a cattle expert.
He testified that barbed wire would tend to discourage cattle
from rubbing against it but field fencing does not have barbs to
discourage a cow from pushing against it.

(TR 358)

When asked

whether an 800 pound steer could get underneath a fence with a
clearance of approximately 20 inches Mr. Burt responded:
Oh yeah, if it's loose. If it's tight it can't
make it, but if it's loose they'll just keep working
until they get up on their shoulders and then go,
especially if there's something they can reach for.
(TR 359 L 8-11)
When asked whether he had observed any tracks in the dirt in
the area of the washout, Trooper Stephens stated:
No. But there again, I didn't go down and do a
total hands on. (TR 93)
Records from the National Climatic Data Center show that at
the time of the accident there had been no rainfall in Snowville
during the month of November.

They additionally show that the

last previous rainfall in Snowville had been 25 days prior to the
accident and that there had only been .07 hundredths of an inch
of rainfall during the entire month of October, 1988 at
Snowville.

(Addendum Ex. #14)

All witnesses agreed that without

moisture, tracks would be very difficult to observe.

3

(TR 159)

UHP Trooper Stephens testified that the lowest strand of
fence above the washout was field fence, lacking any barbs, and
actually quite smooth.

He acknowledged it was not likely there

would be any hair caught on the fence by a steer going under it.
(TR 110f 111)
A unique feature of this location of the interstate is a box
culvert running beneath the traveled portions of the highway.
The structure actually consists of two separate concrete tunnels,
one beneath the lanes of traffic going each direction.

Between

these tunnels in the median there are concrete wing walls and two
short sections of wire fence.

This location is portrayed in

Exhibits 3, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, which are attached to this
Brief in the Addendum in numerical order.

UDOT fence

requirements for this location are standard Type B fence
requiring two inches clearance from the ground to the bottom wire
and 52 inches from the ground to the top wire.

The photographs

show that the fence in the median area is loose, sagging, and
less than 36 inches in height.

These photographs were taken

three years after the accident but undisputed testimony
established the condition of the fence on November 9, 1988 to be
essentially the same as in the photos.

(TR 328)

When asked whether the 800 pound steer could have gone over
the fence in the median section, Tom Wilcock replied:
Yes. That median fence has always been suspect in
my mind. If I had 300 of them, (cattle) 299 could find
their way over it if they wanted. (TR 336 L 21-23)
(parenthetical word added)
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At the time of the accident the gate depicted in Exhibit No,
24 was closed, so that the cattle on the north side of the
freeway could wander into the culvert and fenced median area but
could not continue on through to the south.

(TR 154, 330)

A steer entering the culvert from the north would arrive
at open space in the median, where it would find itself boxed in.
The only way out would be back through the tunnel to the north or
over the sagging fence.

Cattle expert Clinton Burt provided

critical insight into the conditions in the median area of the
culvert:
Q. If a cow is frightened will it react quite
suddenly?
A. Usually yeah. We try to work them real
careful for that reason. Not too much noise.
Q. I want to give you the same hypothetical as
far as the steer, about 18 months old, about 800
pounds. If it were frightened could it jump over a
fence where the top wire was about 36 inches?
A. I imagine it could if there was no other place
to go. It would have to be kind of boxed in.
Q.

If it were boxed in do you think it would do

A.

Yes.

that?
(TR 360 L 14-25, TR 361 L 1)

After being shown various photographic exhibits, including
those attached in the Addendum of this Brief, Burt was asked:
Q. Now I'll represent to you and I think the
photographs depict, that there are lanes of interstate
highway on either side of this area. If an 18 month
old steer were to walk down this culvert and that gate
were closed, is it possible that while standing in this
median area a semi or a horn might frighten the steer?
A. Well, I'm sure it is. When we work cattle in
the corral we box them in. By nature they111 find the
5

spot that is the least resistant and that is why 1 say
boxed in. Sometimes it might even be me that's the
least resistance.
Q. Do they become much more nervous when they're
boxed in?
A.

They're more nervous when boxed in.

Q.

When boxed in they are nervous?

A. Yes. They9re looking for a way out,
regardless, if they get spooked. They911 find the best
place they think they can make it. (TR 361 L 23-25, TR
362 L 1-14)
On redirect Mr. Burt was asked:
Q. Are there also likely places where a cow will
get out?
A. Well, it's like I said, they911 find the least
resistance.
Q. If you had a field and one portion of the
fence was only 36 inches high would you consider that a
likely spot that a cow would get out?
A. According to those pictures I would think it9s
a likely spot in the middle, because you know, they
can9t get through that cement wall. If they9re boxed
in there and are looking for daylight or wherever to
get out sometimes it's even over the top of anybody
else that's there if they're that spooked. (TR 364 L
20-25, TR 365 L 1-7)
On re-cross examination Mr. Burt was asked:
Q. I guess you're assuming that the steer didn't
have a way out this way or that way, right, when you
say this is a likely spot?
A. Well they could get out - I mean, it would be
likely to me, yes, according to the pictures and I
don't know when they were taken or how close, but that
fence is real loose. It's real short and it's about
impossible to make a short fence tight, that's the
thing.

6

Both the washout and the sagging median fence are in close
proximity to the accident location.

(P. Ex. #1)

UDOT employees

and the Utah Highway Patrol Trooper checked the fence for a
considerable distance in both directions from the accident site.
They found no breaks or other problems.

(TR 103 and TR 134, 135)

The following page contains a sketch drawing of the interstate in
the area of the accident.

This drawing was not an Exhibit at

trial but is a composite of numerous exhibits.

It is intended to

assist the reader in becoming oriented to the photographic
exhibits which are included in the Addendum.

7

N
+A

LO

Cat-fl

-£

(JLU shout

Dead S+eer

^a33'*j Fences

Median

seJ Gale

8
This is a Composite Drawing taken from Plaintiff's
Exhibits 3, 5, 6, 21, 22, 24. It is intended to show
the aeneral lavout and is not to scale.

Defendant's Statement of Facts relies heavily on
testimony from Rod Arbon, a UDOT employee.

In quoting Arbon

defendant fails to follow the acknowledged requirement of
marshalling all evidence in support of the jury verdict.

Much of

Arbon's testimony as cited by defendant does not support the jury
verdict.
jury.

Rod Arbon was totally discredited in the eyes of the

Mr. Arbon was called as an adverse witness by the

plaintiff and questioned about his investigation following the
accident.

He testified that he looked closely for tracks where

the steer might have exited the pasture, but found none.

He

testified that he expected to see tracks because there had been a
rain storm just a day or two earlier and the ground was soft and
moist so that tracks would be more visible.

He testified it is

much more difficult to see tracks if the ground is dry and hard.
(TR 159)

He stated that this rain storm was "key" to him in his

investigation.

(TR 161)

Following this testimony plaintiff produced the records from
the National Climatic Data Center showing that there had been no
rainfall for 25 days prior to the accident and that there had
been only .07 hundredths of an inch moisture in the 39 days
preceding the accident.

(Ex. #14 in Addendum)

At best, Mr. Arbon's testimony represents lousy
recollection, at worst, fabrication.

The records from the

weather service were totally unrebutted.

9

Mr. Arbon was a poor witness, as evidenced by the critique
offered by the trial judge in chambers, mercifully outside the
hearing of the witness:
THE COURT: I think his experience as a witness so
far is he hasn't always responded the way the person
asking him the questions would expect him to. (TR 174)
THE COURT: I think he's very confused and I'm
trying to help unconfuse him as to what is expected.
(TR 184)
THE COURT: I think it's very clear that this man
is confused as to where he is looking at it and what
he's supposed to be testifying about. Not necessarily
what his answer is. I don't think he's known from the
time he got on the witness stand what his answer was
supposed to be. (TR 185)
THE COURT: I'll certify him as an adverse witness
but I don't think this jury perceives him as being anti
or pro anybody at this point. Just confused. (TR 188)
THE COURT: This guy is obviously just really
confused. (TR 189)
Instructions 18 and 20 advised the jurors that they could
believe or disregard any witness in accordance with the
credibility they determined the witness to deserve.

After Mr.

Arbon's imaginary rain storm and the court's withering assessment
of him as a witness, it is incredible that defendant's Brief
alleges Arbon's claims of having seen a steer jump a five foot
fence or that Wilcock had cattle further down the freeway were
"unrebutted".

The jurors' verdict confirms that in their eyes

Arbon was discredited.

10

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr, there was an
abundance of evidence adduced at trial from numerous witnesses
supporting Suhr's theory that the steer had been in the pasture
on the north side of the highway and that it escaped either
beneath the fence at the washout or over the fence in the median
area.

The circumstances at the time of the accident were such

that it would be highly unlikely to find direct evidence
regarding how the steer entered the highway.

The volume of

circumstantial evidence is highly persuasive and was unanimously
accepted by this jury.

Because substantial competent evidence

supports the jury's verdict, it should be affirmed as a matter of
law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
Federal and state requirements mandate Type B fence with a
maximum clearance of two inches from ground level to the lowest
wire and a minimum height of 52 inches from ground level to the
top wire.

Defendant's opening statement promised the jurors that

the evidence would show the fence in the location of the accident
met established standards.

(TR 44, 51)

Subsequently the

evidence showed that the clearance beneath the fence at the
washout was 18 to 24 inches and the height of the median fence

11

was sagging at less than 36 inches.

The lowest wire in the area

of the washout was field fence containing no barbs and,
therefore, having nothing to prevent a steer from pushing against
it.

Not only was the median fence more than 16 inches too low,

all experts agreed that a sagging fence would make it much easier
for a steer to escape than would a tight fence of the same
height.

It is beyond dispute that the defendant was guilty of

negligence in its maintenance of the fences.

The evidence also

strongly indicated negligence in the overall design of the
fences, culvert and drainage.
Trooper Stephens and UDOT employees checked all freeway
fences within approximately one mile of the accident location and
found no other points where the integrity of the fence was in
question.
Four witnesses with extensive experience with cattle
testified concerning the conditions of the fence at the washout
and median locations and provided their opinions as to whether
the steer entered the freeway at one of those two locations.

It

is obvious from the trial court's statements and the jury's
verdict that Rod Arbon was discredited.

His testimony, having no

value in the eyes of the jury, will not be reviewed here.
Trooper Paul Stephens testified that the steer could have
gotten far enough under the fence to force its way through at the
washout.

Trooper Stephens was not asked about the median fence

and there is no indication he even inspected it.
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The steer owner, Tom Wilcock, stated that the steer could
have gone under the fence at the washout.

When asked about the

possibility of the steer going over the fence in the median
section Wilcock stated that in his opinion 299 out of 300 steers
could go over that section of fence if they wanted to.
Rancher Clinton Burt testified that if there were 20 inches
of clearance beneath the field fence, such as in the area of the
washout, the steer could have gone under the fence.

Burt

testified that noises easily spook cattle and that cattle do not
like to be boxed in.

When asked whether a steer the age and size

in question could jump a 36 inch fence if it were boxed in Burt
very directly answered "yes".

Burt repeatedly explained that

cattle find the point of least resistance or the best place they
think they can get out.

He testified that the fence in the

median section constituted a likely spot where the steer escaped
and that to him, according to the photographic exhibits, it was
likely the steer went over the median fence.
Clinton Burt has been a cattle rancher his entire life.
Defendant's Brief misrepresents two colloquialisms from Mr.
Burt's testimony.

When asked whether the specific steer could

jump over a 36 inch fence Mr. Burt responded, "I imagine it
could."

(TR 360)

In agricultural vernacular the word "imagine"

is intended to convey belief or agreement, not hallucination.
Mr. Burt also testified, "If they're boxed in there and are
looking for daylight or wherever to get out, sometimes its even
over the top of anybody else that is there if they're that
13

spooked."

(TR 365)

Mr. Burt clearly was conveying that an 800

pound steer would knock a human being down and run over the top
of the person.

Defendants Brief at page 7 attempts to construe

this statement as an indication the steer would leap high over
the head of an individual and that this, therefore, corroborates
Arbon's claims of a steer jumping a five foot fence.

Defendant's

misinterpretation of Burt's statement is as believable as the
nursery rhyme where the cow jumped over the moon.
A review of all evidence presented to the jury leaves one
persuaded that direct evidence as to how the steer exited the
pasture would be highly unlikely.

There were no eye witnesses,

the ground was rock hard, and the fence was not likely to grab
any hair or hide.
Direct evidence is not required for a verdict.
Jurors may not speculate as to possibilities; they
may, however, make justifiable inferences from
circumstancial evidence to find negligence or proximate
cause. In such instances, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to establish a prima facia case of
negligence, if men of reasonable minds may conclude
that there is a greater probability that the conduct
relied upon was the proximate cause of the injury than
there is that it was not. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed.
497 P2d 28, 31 (Ut. 1972). Also see Mason v. Arizona
Public Service Commission, 622 P2d 493 (Az. App. 1980),
Holmes v. Gamble, 624 P2d 905 (Colo. App. 1980),
Jacques v. Montana National Guard. 649 P2d 1319 (Mont.
1982) and Klossner v. San Juan County. 586 P2d 899
(Wash. App. 1978)
The circumstantial evidence in this case is compelling.

It led

eight reasonable jurors to unanimously conclude the steer got
onto the interstate as a result of defendant's negligence.
jury's verdict should be affirmed.
14

The

POINT II.
THE CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT ARE EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE.
Defendant relies heavily on Rhiness v. Dansie. 472 P2d 428
(Ut. 1970).

The following factual summary from the Rhiness

opinion is critical:
. . • the defendant's land had a gate therein
which was used by defendant and others. This gate was
kept fastened by means of a chain with a snap on one
end.
On the night in question the gate was partially
open at the time of the collision. The defendant had
been at the property on the day in question and
observed at the time he left that the gate was securely
fastened. Rhiness. 429 (emphasis added)
The court ruled there was no showing of negligence against
the defendant.

The court was obviously relying heavily on the

fact that the gate was not under the exclusive control of this
defendant and there was no evidence of this defendant having been
negligent in his maintenance of the gate.

Obviously an unknown

third party had left the gate open following defendant's
departure that day.
In Vanderwater vs. Hatch. 835 F2d 239 (Tenth Circuit, 1987)
the evidence showed no evidence of any defects in the pasture
fence.

There was a five mile stretch of open range beginning

one-half to three-fourths of a mile west of the accident scene.
Plaintiff presented no expert testimony regarding negligence.
The court ruled that a res ipsa loquitor instruction was not
appropriate under the circumstances.

15

Unlike Vanderwater. the present case involves (1) two
glaring defects in the pasture fence, (2) no open rangef and (3)
testimony from multiple experts regarding defendant's negligent
conduct and the likelihood that this allowed the steer's presence
on the freeway.
In Mitchell vs. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P2d 240 (Ut. 1985)
the victim was found murdered in his hotel room and the crime was
never solved.

The court noted:

The fact that there was no evidence of forced
entry into Mitchell's room could be probative of
entrance by a person using an unauthorized master or
room key. However, it could also be probative of
entrance, at Mitchell's invitation, by a friend or
collegue. Mitchell. 246. (emphasis added)
The decision turns on the fact that the hotel room was not
under the exclusive control of the hotel company.

The victim may

well have unknowingly or under duress invited the assailant into
the victim's room.

Such circumstances would not constitute

negligence on the part of the hotel.
In the present case there is no possibility that Suhr
invited the steer onto the freeway.
Defendant cites Staheli vs. Farmers Cooperative of Southern
Utah. 655 P2d 680 (Ut. 1982) a case in which plaintiff filed suit
seeking to recover for grain stored with defendant and destroyed
by fire.

In its recitation of facts the court noted:

The portion of the cellar not leased to the
(defendant) was retained and used by the owner for its
purposes. There was no wall or partition between that
part of the pit leased to the (defendant) and that part
retained by (owner) for its own use. The farmers whose
grain was stored in (owner's) potato cellar knew that
the (defendant) was using that facility for their grain
16

because they had hauled their grain into and out of the
potato pit. . . 681.
The (plaintiff) as well as agents of the
(defendant) had unlimited access to the pit through
both the end leased to the (defendant) and the end
retained by the owner; there were transients who were
observed in or around the potato pit on October 6, 1976
The court's opinion begins by recognizing the general rule
of law that where goods baled for a fee are damaged, a
presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee.

Two excerpts

from the court's opinion are particularly relevant for the
present considerations.
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that
the bailee be in exclusive possession, and it is that
proposition that gives logical force to the
presumption. . .
This court has observed that the evidentiary rules
governing balement are in some respects similar to
those governing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor,
although there are important procedural
differences . . . Exclusive control of or
responsibility for the instrumentality causing the
injury is necessary to give rise to an inference of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
Staheli 683 (emphasis added)
Rhiness, Mitchell, and Staheli are concerned respectively
with a gate, a hotel room, and a storage bin.

The appellate

court in Rhiness found the gate was not under the exclusive
control of defendant, in Mitchell the hotel room was not under
the exclusive control of defendant, in Staheli the storage bin
was not under the exclusive control of defendant.

These cases

are all distinguishable from the present case. This fence was
under the exclusive control of this defendant.

17

There is no

conceivable theory whereby a third party suddenly caused the
washout or the problems with the median fence.

These cases give

no support to defendant's position.
POINT III.
THE JURY'S VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
This trial lasted four long days.

The jury deliberated four

and three-quarters hours. Jury instructions 24, 25, 26, 32 and
33 all addressed the issue of causation, and are included in this
Brief in the Addendum.
In denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict the trial judge offered valuable
insights into the evidence and this jury;
The real question that the court has is there
sufficient evidence that was placed before the jury to
satisfy them by a preponderance of the evidence that
there was in fact negligence, that there was in fact
causation and there was in fact damages? I polled the
jury and I think - let me say this for the record, I
think that there were sufficient instructions on
causation because the jury needed to understand what
the court was expecting them to find before they could
find liability. They've been referred to by
plaintiff's counsel and the court has looked at them
again and I'm satisfied that in fact they did that. I
don't know if there's an objection on file to those
instructions somewhere or not, but that can be raised
in another forum for someone else.
In my
that there
negligence
related to
fence.

judgment, on causation, the jury understood
had to be a relationship of causation and
on the part of the state. In this case it
the fencing and the maintenance of the

I also am of the opinion that the court must
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict. I agree with the interpretation and with the
citation that plaintiff has given me. I think that's
the law. It doesn't mean that I would have given the
same verdict or that I even agree with the verdict. It
18

is just that there is sufficient evidence to show - to
satisfy a jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, as
to causation. That's really the question.
There was evidence back and forth on both sides
and there was no actual testimony as to where the steer
actually got out for sure, but there was testimony that
it could have walked over one place and crawled over
another place. The court notes that the jury was
troubled by that and they felt that perhaps that was
causation, the fact that the steer was hit in the
immediate location of those two areas of the fence,
very close to those two areas of the fence.
I don't recall that every being argued, really
directly, but I think that the facts are consistent
with the fact that the steer was hit very close to the
defects in the fence, which adds, again, more weight to
the fact that the steer, by a preponderance, got over
the negligent portion of the fence, which relates then
to the causation question. (January 8, 1992 Transcript
of Findings and Ruling pages 2, 3, and 4)
The Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated the standards to
be applied when reviewing a jury verdict.
. . . we defer to the jury and evaluate the
evidence in a light favorable to the verdict. We
accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support
the verdict rather than contrary inferences that
support the appellant's version of the facts, even if
we might have judged those inferences differently had
we been deciding the matter in the first instance, and
not as an appellate court . . . When the testimony of
witnesses is in conflict, we accept that testimony
which supports the jury's verdict, unless it is
inheritantly implausible, and ignore the evidence which
does not support the verdict, even if we might think it
more convincing . . . for the appellants to overturn
the jury verdict, therefore, they must set out in their
briefs, with record references, all the evidence that
supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to
that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people
would not conclude that the evidence supports the
verdict. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P2d 151,
156 (Utah 1991)
. . . We exercise "every reasonable presumption in
favor of the validity of a general verdict." To give
effect to that presumption we look to pleadings,
evidence, instructions, verdict forms and the manner in
19

which the case was tried to determine whether possible
error in the verdict is reversible. . . General
verdicts are to be construed with a view to sustaining
the verdict and effectuating the intention of the iurv
if possible. Where that intention is not clearly
apparent from the verdict itself inferences may be
drawn from the evidence, the pleadings, the jury
instructions and other relevant portions of the record.
Hodges 164 (emphasis added)
In the present case there is no need to speculate as to how
the jury viewed the issue of proximate cause.

Page 2 of the

Special Verdict Form, question number 2, appears as follows:
If defendant State of Utah was negligent as alleged,
did such negligence proximately cause the plaintiff,
Michael H. Suhr, to sustain injuries?
ANSWER:
Yes
In King v. Feredav the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A trial court should grant a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict if, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
it finds that no competent evidence supports the
verdict. In reviewing the trial court's determination
on such an issue, this court must apply the same
standard. King v. Fereday. 739 P2d 618, 620 (Ut. 1987)
Issues of negligence and issues of proximate cause are
usually factual issues and in most circumstances are not resolved
as a matter of law.

Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P2d

614 (Ut. 1985) and Unigard Insurance Company v. Citv of LaVerkin,
689 P2d 1344 (Ut. 1984)
In conclusion plaintiff refers the court to State v.
Webster, 504 P2d 1316 (Nev. 1972)

That case involved seven dark

colored horses which had escaped from a pasture located near an
unguarded entrance to a newly constructed controlled-access
freeway on the evening of December 14, 1967.

20

The facts indicate

that the accident occurred at around 11:00 p.m. on a "dark,
moonless night".

The trial court determined the state was

negligent in failing to install a cattle guard at the freeway
entrance and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the accident.

A review of the opinion makes clear that no

eyewitnesses observed the horses enter the interstate at this
location.

Rather, through a process of deduction, it was

determined that this was the only location where the horses could
have entered.

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff.
The jury in the present case consisted of eight reasonable
people who were accepted by the defendant.

They participated

patiently and attentively throughout four days of trial. They
received numerous instructions concerning the law with regards to
causation.

They deliberated almost five hours.

They returned a

special verdict which specifically found the negligence of the
defendant to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.

The

jury was subsequently interviewed by the trial court and the
judge found that the jury read and understood the instructions
and in the court's opinion had properly applied them to the
evidence.
The defendant's Brief does not come close to meeting the
standard identified for reversal of a jury verdict.

On the

contrary, there is substantial evidence to support the jury's
verdict and it should be affirmed as a matter of law.

21

CONCLUSION
There was an abundance of circumstantial evidence of causal
connection between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
injuries.

The cases relied upon by defendant are easily

distinguishable in that the fence in this case was under the
exclusive control of the defendant.

The jury's verdict should be

affirmed as a matter of law.
DATED this

day of July, 1992.

BEN H. HADFIELD
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed postage prepaid to the
following:
Debra J. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

BEN H. HADFIELD
tr/11:suhr.brf
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ADDENDUM
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - Median Fence
Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 - Fence Specifications
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 - Weather Records
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 - Median Area
Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 - Median Fence with Yard Stick
Plaintiff's Exhibit 23 - Tom Wilcock at Median Fence
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 - Box Tunnels with Closed Gate
Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 - Close Up Median Fence with Yard Stick
Jury Instruction No. 20 - Credibility of Witnesses
Jury Instruction No. 24 - Proximate Cause
Jury Instruction No. 25 - Proximate Cause
Jury Instruction No. 26 - Negligence - Proximate Cause
Jury Instruction No. 32 - Definitions, Negligence - Proximate
Cause
Jury Instruction No. 33 - Mere Fact that Animal Escaped Not
Sufficient
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INSTRUCTION NO,

ffl)

If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as
to any material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of
the witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated by
other credible evidence.

0226c

JURY INSTRUCTION

r*t

A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, produces the injury and without which the
injury would not have occurred.

A proximate cause is one which sets

in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.

0236c

INSTRUCTION NO.

In addition to deciding whether the defendant was negligent,
you must decide if that negligence was a "proximate cause" of the
plaintiff's injuries.
To find "proximate cause"/ you must first find a cause and
effect relationship between the negligence and plaintiff*s injury.
But cause and effect alone is not enough.

For injuries to be

proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present:
First/ the negligence must have played a substantial role in
causing the injuries; and
Second, a reasonable person could foresee that the injury
could result from the negligent behavior.

0235c

&[p

INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case the plaintiff claims that the defendant State of
Utah was negligent in the following respects:
1.

Negligence in maintaining a fence;

2.

Improper design of drainage areas.

Defendant State of Utah claims that if anybody was negligent
and at fault for the steer getting on the highway, it was the
landowner or operator.
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a
preponderance of the evidence thatvi I
1.

4

* 0*

*rt r\ * »

Onn nr^iulili uf M I L dafuMewiLj we»e negligent in one or

more of the particulars alleged; and
2.

Such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's

injuries.
If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions,
you must then decide the amount of the damages suffered by the
plaintiff.

0229c

INSTRUCTION NO.

/3£

The terms "negligence", "contributory negligence", "ordinary
care", and "proximate cause", as used in these instructions, are
defined as follows:
A.

"Negligence" means the failure to do what a reasonable

and prudent person would have done under the circumstances
involved, or doing what a reasonable and prudent person would not
have done under such circumstances.

The faulty conduct may lie

either in acting or in not acting.* The standard of conduct
required in any given case is dictated and measured by the
immediate requirements of the occasion as determined from the
existing facts and circumstances. You will note that the person
whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinary
cautious individual, not the exceptionally skillful one, but a
person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While exceptional
caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged, the law does
not demand them as a general standard of conduct;
B.

"Contributory Negligence" is negligence on the part of

the person injured which, alone or together with the negligence
of the other party, contributes in proximately causing such
person's own injury;

C.

"Ordinary Care" is that degree of care which a

reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar
circumstances.

"Ordinary Care" implies that exercise of

reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be
exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person;
D.

A "proximate cause" of an injury is a cause which in

direct unbroken sequence produces the injury.

It is one without

which the injury would not have occurred.
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate
cause of an injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or
the conduct of only one person.

To the contrary, the acts and

omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the
efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each of the
participating acts or omissions is regarded by the law as a
proximate cause and all may be responsible.

INSTRUCTION NO.

In order for the plaintiff to recover in this action he must
show, among other things, that the steer got upon the highway
through the negligence of the defendant.

"The mere fact that the

animal escaped from the enclosure is not sufficient evidence,
standing alone, to justify" recovery based on negligence!

0239c

